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The aims of this paper are twofold: fi rst, to identify a sense of ‘popular 
art’ in which the question, ‘can there be popular art?’ is interesting and 
the answer to this question is not obvious; second, to propose and de-
fend a challenging but attractive answer to this question: challenging 
in that it draws some distinctions we might not initially be inclined to 
draw, and attractive in offering a productive way of thinking about the 
ontology, epistemology, and axiology of the kinds of artifacts proposed as 
examples of ‘popular art’. I take the ‘interesting’ question to be whether, 
given a way of distinguishing artworks from other kinds of artifacts, 
there can be artworks that meet the conditions set out by Noel Carroll for 
what he terms ‘mass art’. I sketch a way of thinking about the distinction 
between artworks and other artifacts—what I term the neo-Goodmanian 
approach—and then explore the implications of the neo-Goodmanian 
approach for the existence of ‘popular art’, and vice versa. In so doing, 
I subsume these issues under a more general problem for the neo-Good-
manian—what I term the problem of ‘fast art’. I argue that, while the 
neo-Goodmanian can embrace artworks that are ‘popular’ in the sense 
of being targeted at a wide audience, she should insist that there cannot 
be artworks that meet all of Carroll’s requirements for being ‘mass art’.
Keywords: Popular art, ‘mass art’, popular music, ‘fast art’, neo-
Goodmanian aesthetics, the ‘functional artwork’ problem.
1. Aims and structure
My aims in this paper are twofold. First, I want to identify a sense of 
‘popular art’ in which the question, ‘can there be popular art and if 
so under what circumstances?’ is interesting and the answer to this 
question is not obvious. Second, I want to propose and defend a chal-
lenging but attractive answer to this question: challenging in that it 
draws some distinctions we might not initially be inclined to draw, and 
attractive in offering a productive way of thinking about the ontology, 
epistemology, and axiology of the kinds of artifacts proposed as exam-
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ples of ‘popular art’. I begin by distinguishing the sense of ‘popular art’ 
of interest to me from other senses of the term. I further suggest that 
the ‘high art/low art’ and ‘art/not art’ distinctions are attempts to an-
swer different questions. I then introduce a way of thinking about the 
distinction between artworks and other artifacts that I have proposed 
elsewhere. In the remainder of the paper, I explore the implications of 
this conception of artworks for the nature and existence of ‘popular art’ 
in the designated sense.
2. Making sense of ‘popular art’: What is the question? 
The term ‘popular art’ (or sometimes ‘popular culture’) is usually em-
ployed to pick out what is taken to be an accepted extension, rather 
than by reference to an accepted meaning for the term, or of the unit 
terms that it comprises. This supposed extension, furthermore, is not 
usually understood as a subset of a wider set whose members are tak-
en to satisfy accepted conditions for being art. Unlike ‘point-and-shoot’ 
cameras, we do not have a prior conception of what it is for something 
to be an artwork which allows us to take some things satisfying this 
conception to have the further property of being ‘popular’. To arrive at 
a well-defi ned and interesting question that we can proceed to explore, 
therefore, we must start by distinguishing different senses in which 
artworks might be described as ‘popular’, and, indeed, different senses 
in which artifacts might be described as being ‘art’.
There are artifacts that are indisputably artworks and that are 
also ‘popular’ in the sense of being liked or admired by many people. 
Examples might include Leonardo’s Mona Lisa, Vivaldi’s The Four 
Seasons, and Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice. Equally uncontrover-
sially, there are presumed artworks whose creators intended that they 
be popular in the sense of being liked or admired by many people. This 
might be the case with at least some of the fi rst set of examples, but 
it would also apply more widely to artifacts with artistic pretensions 
aimed at a mass audience. Less obvious, however, is whether an arti-
fact can be an artwork if it is intended for appreciation by a wide audi-
ence in virtue of not requiring, in those targeted, the kinds of cognitive 
or perceptual skills normally employed in our appreciative engagement 
with artworks. Such artifacts fi t Noel Carroll’s defi nition of what he 
terms ‘mass art’. A mass artwork, according to Carroll, “is intentionally 
designed to gravitate in its structural choices (for example, its narra-
tive forms, symbolism, intended affect, and even its content) toward 
those choices that promise accessibility with minimum effort, virtually 
on fi rst contact, for the largest number of untutored (or relatively untu-
tored) audiences” (Carroll 1998: 196).
The question I want to ask in this paper is whether some or all 
works of ‘mass art’ in Carroll’s sense are rightly thought of as works of 
mass art, rather than as non-artistic mass artifacts. Note that some-
thing’s being designed so as to be able to fulfi l its assigned function for 
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the widest possible number of consumers by not requiring refi ned cog-
nitive or more broadly perceptual skills normally does not prevent that 
thing from being an artifact of a given kind. A ‘point-and-shoot’ camera 
is still a camera, a ‘large-print’ information sheet in a museum is still 
an information sheet, and a self-described ‘dummy-proof’ income-tax 
programme is still an income-tax programme. Why, then, might being 
maximally accessible in virtue of requiring minimal cognitive or per-
ceptual skills in a competent receiver disqualify something from being 
an artwork? There are no reasons to think that the conditions some-
thing must satisfy to qualify as a camera, a museum information sheet, 
or an income tax programme make any reference to the specifi c cogni-
tive or perceptual skills required in the target audience, other than 
certain linguistic skills. But in the absence of some prior grasp of what 
conditions must be satisfi ed for something to qualify as an artwork, we 
cannot draw a parallel lesson in the case of ‘popular art’. Our task is to 
see if there are indeed any good reasons to think that, given the most 
plausible account of the conditions for being an artwork, these condi-
tions bear materially on the possibility of something’s being ‘mass art’ 
in Carroll’s sense.
First, however, we must say something about a couple of other dis-
tinctions in the neighbourhood. Consider the distinction sometimes 
drawn between ‘high art’ and ‘low art’, usually in terms of differences 
in the intended functions of artifacts. High art, it might be said, aims at 
edifi cation, moral improvement, and cognitive insight, whereas low art 
aims at entertainment, pleasurable experience, and distraction from 
worldly cares. The high art/low art distinction, so conceived, relates to 
whether a work is intended to promote ‘higher’ human capacities and 
interests, or ‘lower’ human capacities and interests. On the other hand, 
those who make a distinction between that which is art and that which 
is not art assume that there is a principled difference between artworks 
and other artifacts. In principle, the two distinctions are orthogonal 
to one another. A sermon might be an example of high non-art, while 
Egon Schiele’s pornographic drawings commissioned to speak to the 
baser natures of patrons might exemplify low art.
But can we draw such a principled distinction between artworks 
and non-artistic artifacts? There are reasons embedded in our linguis-
tic and non-linguistic practice to think that intuitively, at least, we 
draw such a distinction. We resist saying that all artifacts, or even all 
artifacts with aesthetic properties intended to perceptually or cogni-
tively engage an audience—such as cars, televisions, clothes, and cere-
al packages—are artworks. We also resist saying that any artifact that 
employs what are recognized artistic media is art. It is true that, as 
Larry Shiner (1994) has noted, there is a broad sense of ‘art’ in which 
what primary school children do with paint and brushes in art class is 
art. But this ‘broad’ usage seems restricted to cases where the predomi-
nant use of a medium is artistic, as it is with the kinds of materials 
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standardly used in art-painting (as opposed to those standardly used 
in house painting), and we do not speak here of works of art, save oc-
casionally in an evaluative sense. There is no analogous temptation to 
say that the vast majority of holiday photographs, or home movies of 
family events, are, in a broad sense, art. Similar considerations would 
deny most linguistic artifacts status as (works of) literary art, even in a 
broad sense. Music and dance are interesting cases: most uses of musi-
cal instruments result in events that are ‘art’ in this broad sense, but 
not works of art, whereas social dance is rarely thought of as art at all 
in spite of its expressive elements.
These refl ections put us in a better position to clarify what is philo-
sophically interesting about the artistic status of Carroll’s ‘mass art’. 
If by ‘art’ we mean art in the broad sense identifi ed by Shiner, then 
Carroll’s works of ‘mass art’ are probably art, but, as we just saw, this 
doesn’t make them ‘works of art’. But the broad sense of ‘art’ is not of 
any obvious philosophical interest. Shiner himself, discussing debates 
over the artistic status of artifacts used in African and other non-West-
ern cultures, argues that those involved in such debates often fail to 
properly distinguish the broad sense of ‘art’ from ‘high art’ and falla-
ciously infer, from the existence of ‘art’ in the broad sense in such cul-
tures, to their possessing works of high art. But the question whether 
works of ‘mass art’ are works of high art is no more philosophically 
interesting than the question whether they are art in the broad sense. 
For in this case the answer is presumably negative: works of ‘mass art’, 
if they are works of art, will generally be works of low art. As may now 
be clear, if there is a philosophically interesting question pertaining to 
the status of ‘mass art’ as art, it is one we can raise only if we fi rst offer 
some kind of principled distinction between artifacts that are works 
of art—a class taken to comprise both high and low art—and artifacts 
that are not works of art. How such a principled distinction might best 
be drawn is the subject of the next section.
3. Artworks and other artifacts: 
The ‘functional artwork’ problem
If we seek a way of distinguishing artworks from other artifacts that 
might aid us in assessing the idea of ‘popular art’ or ‘mass art’ in Car-
roll’s sense, a useful strategy is to consider what may be termed the 
‘functional artwork problem’. It is clear that there are visual and verbal 
creations widely viewed as being works of art that have as their prima-
ry intended function the promotion of some instrumental end. Obvious 
examples are early Renaissance religious paintings such as the devo-
tional works of Perugino (see Baxandall 1988), drawings by Schiele 
and Klimt executed to serve the pornographic interests of patrons, and 
art intended to promote a political end such as later works by Lyubov 
Popova, Eisenstein’s October, and Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the 
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Will. What conditions must be met if such artifacts are to be correctly 
viewed as artworks, while other artifacts with the same kind of instru-
mental primary intended function—sermons, pornographic drawings 
in male washrooms, and Nazi anti-semitic fi lms—are not? The ‘func-
tional artwork problem’ is the problem of accounting for the artistic 
status of some, but not all, artifacts with a given instrumental primary 
intended function.
It has generally been assumed that an answer to the functional 
artwork problem follows unproblematically from a consideration of 
artifacts whose primary intended function is an artistic one—that is, 
artifacts created with the primary intention that they be appreciated 
as artworks. The assumption here is that what makes artifacts with an 
instrumental primary intended function artworks is that they have an 
artistic secondary intended function—that is, that, whatever their pri-
mary intended function may be, their makers also intended that they 
be appreciated as artworks. Where theorists of such a mind differ is 
over what ‘being appreciated as an artwork’ itself requires, and thus 
over what must be intended by the maker if the resulting artifact is 
to be an artwork. Is this a matter, for example, of (i) intentionally pos-
sessing certain kinds of manifest ‘aesthetic’ qualities (e.g. Beardsley 
1983), (ii) being intended for consumption within a particular kind of 
institutional context (e.g. Dickie 1974), or (ii) being intended for the 
kind of (artistic) regard accorded to those things already accepted as 
artworks (Levinson 1979)?
The idea that artworks are artifacts produced with the primary or 
secondary intention that they be appreciated as artworks is the resid-
ual legacy of 19th century assumptions about the autonomy of art, and 
more particularly of the otherwise discredited idea of ‘art for art’s sake’ 
(on the latter, see Wilcox 1953). But it is diffi cult to reconcile this idea 
not only with much pre-nineteenth century Western art but also with 
the widely shared belief that the extension of our concept of art com-
prises many artifacts produced in cultures historically and culturally 
remote from our own where the idea of art as an autonomous practice 
seems to have no hold. This motivates seeking a different kind of an-
swer to the functional artwork problem. I have proposed elsewhere, as 
the basis for such an answer, what I have termed the ‘neo-Goodmanian 
approach’ (Davies 2011: chapter 1). This, I have suggested, offers an al-
ternative account of the arthood of canonical artworks that unproblem-
atically extends to putative artworks whose primary intended function 
is instrumental. I shall not defend this approach here,1 but shall briefl y 
sketch its principal claims and then assess its bearing upon Carroll’s 
notion of ‘mass art’.
The central claim of the neo-Goodmanian approach is that artworks 
differ from other artifacts in that they require a particular kind of re-
1 I defend this approach in the monograph provisionally titled The Workings of 
Art that I am currently completing.
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gard on the part of the receiver in virtue of how they are intended to 
perform whatever primary intended function they have, whether artis-
tic or instrumental. This approach draws on Richard Wollheim’s talk 
(1980) of a kind of regard for which artworks call, and Nelson Good-
man’s talk (1968, 1978) of ‘symptoms of the aesthetic’ that characterise 
the ways in which artworks function as symbols.
Wollheim’s notion of a distinctively artistic kind of regard should not 
be confused with the notion of ‘artistic regard’ central to Jerrold Levin-
son’s ‘historical defi nition of art’. Levinson (1979) claims that ‘what it 
is to correctly regard an artwork varies both synchronically and dia-
chronically. Nevertheless, we can defi ne what it is for an artefact to be 
an artwork in terms of its maker’s intention, opaquely or transparently 
construed, that the artefact be regarded in a way that is a correct way 
of regarding those things already accepted as artworks.’ But Levinson’s 
notion of ‘artistic regard’ is tied to the idea that artworks are artifacts 
whose makers intend them to be appreciated as artworks, not to the 
idea that a particular kind of regard is necessary for works to perform 
whatever primary intended function they may have. In a later paper he 
writes: “It is a necessary condition for something to be an artwork that 
its maker intends that receivers take an ‘artistic interest’ in the artistic 
vehicle—an interest in ‘the way content is embodied in form, the way 
medium has been employed to convey content’” (Levinson 2005: 232)
Wollheim, on the other hand, speaks of ‘artistic regard’ in respond-
ing to ‘aesthetic attitude’ theories of what is required for the experien-
tial appreciation of artworks (Wollheim 1980: 91–98). Perhaps the most 
discussed such theory involves Jerome Stolnitz’s distinction (1992) be-
tween two kinds of perception, ‘practical perception’ and ‘aesthetic per-
ception’. He characterizes the latter as “disinterested and sympathetic 
attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, 
for its own sake alone” (Stolnitz 1992: 10). Wollheim responds that, 
if talk of the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is to contribute to our understanding 
of artworks, it must be defi ned in terms of a kind of ‘regard’ proper to 
artworks and only derivatively applied to things we take to be non-art. 
The ‘regard’ called for by something taken to be an artistic manifold is 
addressed to an entity taken to have the following distinctive qualities:
1) It is an artifact, whose details (‘form’) must be seen as organized 
for some purpose. An artistic manifold calls, therefore, for an 
‘interrogative’ exploration—one that seeks to make sense of the 
manifold in terms of reasons for its being ordered in the way 
that it is.
2) It is historically situated, thus requiring that the purposiveness 
found in the details be a purpose reasonably ascribed in light of 
the historical context of the making.
Wollheim further claims that “it is part of the spectator’s attitude to 
art that he should adopt this attitude towards the work: that he should 
make it the object of an ever-increasing or deepening attention,” so that 
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more and more of the properties of the art object “may become incorpo-
rated into its aesthetic nature.” (Wollheim 1980: 123) 
Wollheim suggests that “if we want to test any hypothesis about the 
spectator’s attitude to artworks, it would be instructive to take cases 
where there is something that is a work of art which is habitually not 
regarded as one, and which we then at a certain moment come to see 
as one” (1980: 120). Applying Wollheim’s suggestion to such works as 
Yvonne Rainer’s Room Service, I have identifi ed (2011: chapter 1) the 
following distinctive features of the regard for which artworks call:
1) Close attention to the fi ne details of the artistic vehicle is neces-
sary if we are to correctly determine the content articulated,
2) Artistic vehicles often serve to exemplify some of their proper-
ties,
3) Many of the different properties of the vehicle contribute to the 
articulation of content, and fi nally
4) The vehicle not only serves a number of distinct articulatory 
functions, but does so in a ‘hierarchical’ manner, where ‘higher 
level’ content is articulated through lower level content.
These seem to be the features characterised in more technical terms by 
Goodman as what he terms the ‘symptoms of the aesthetic’. The latter 
are identifi ed as:
1) ‘syntactic density’—where the fi nest differences in certain re-
spects between characters is a difference in symbols.
2) ‘semantic density’—where symbols are provided for things dis-
tinguished by the fi nest differences in certain respects.
3) ‘exemplifi cation’, where a symbol symbolizes by serving as a 
sample of properties it literally or metaphorically possesses, 
4) ‘relative repleteness’—where comparatively many aspects of a 
symbol are signifi cant, and
5) ‘multiple or complex reference’. (Goodman 1968: 252–55; Good-
man 1978: 67–68)
According to the neo-Goodmanian account, artworks differ from other 
artifacts that involve content articulated through vehicles—e.g. road 
signs, everyday uses of ordinary language—in virtue of the ways in 
which they articulate the contents bearing upon the performance of 
their primary intended functions, whatever those functions may be. 
This is a matter of being intended to function as an ‘aesthetic symbol’ in 
Goodman’s sense. It is in virtue of these distinctive ways of articulating 
content that artworks must be regarded in a distinctive way. To adopt 
the ‘aesthetic attitude’ (in Wollheim’s sense) to an artistic vehicle is to 
engage in an interrogative exploration of that vehicle constrained by a 
knowledge of its history of making, in the interest of grasping a specifi c 
artistic content articulated ‘aesthetically’, as characterised by Good-
man. There is no need for the maker to intend that we take an artistic 
interest in Levinson’s sense in the artifact, even if it is necessary that 
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we take such an interest if we are to critically appreciate the artifact 
as an artwork (on the relevant notion of ‘critical appreciation’ here, see 
section V below).
A notion introduced by Levinson (2005) in arguing against the pos-
sibility of pornographic art is helpful here. Levinson acknowledges that 
the most diffi cult cases for his account are cases of what he terms ‘artful 
pornography’, where artistic means are used to further pornographic 
ends. For the neo-Goodmanian, however, it is through being ‘artful’ in 
a neo-Goodmanian way—through articulating the content that bears 
upon an artifact’s primary intended function ‘aesthetically’ in Good-
man’s sense2—that something qualifi es as an artwork. This generalizes 
from artifacts with a primary intended pornographic function to arti-
facts with the other kinds of instrumental primary intended functions 
discussed earlier in setting out the ‘functional artwork’ problem. For 
the neo-Goodmanian, a ‘functional artwork’ is an artwork in virtue of 
being ‘artful’ in this sense. To illustrate this idea, consider Matthew 
Kieran’s defence (2001) of the artistic status of the pornographic draw-
ings of Klimt and Rodin. He says of some of Rodin’s nude drawings:
In such drawings we have an emphasis on compositional and design ele-
ments, some of which are a striking deviation from classical nude studies, in 
order to evoke sexual stimulation by sexually explicit means... The specifi -
cally artistically innovative developments in Rodin’s line drawing enabled 
him to characterize the lines of action, sexual embraces, and actions in a 
more athletic, impulsive, vigorous manner which enhances the evocation of 
sexual arousal. (Kieran 2001: 37)
And he describes the ‘artful’ nature of Klimt’s erotic drawings as fol-
lows:
Formal artistic techniques are deployed in a highly imaginative manner in 
order to emphasize explicitly sexual parts, features, actions, and states—in-
cluding the use of extreme close-up views, foreshortening, exaggerated per-
spective, distortions of posture and proportion, shifts in framing, heightened 
contrasts between right-angles and curves of the body. The effect is not only 
beautiful in terms of the grace of line drawing and structural composition, 
but serves to draw attention to sexual features such as the genitals, breasts, 
buttocks and open legs. Furthermore, these formal artistic techniques are 
used to emphasize our awareness of the states of sexual absorption, sensual 
pleasure, or languid sexuality represented. (Kieran 2001: 39–40)
4. Neo-Goodmanian aesthetics 
and the problem of ‘Fast Art’
What kind of account can we give of ‘popular art’ or ‘mass art’, as 
conceived by Carroll, if we subscribe to the neo-Goodmanian account 
of what it is for an artifact to be an artwork? In a number of places 
2 But being ‘artful’ in using traditional aesthetic properties for such a purpose is 
another matter. For this kind of approach, see Stephen Davies’s claim (2006) that 
artworks are artifacts that possess ‘functional beauty’.
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(Davies 2004: 16–23; Davies 2009; Davies 2017) I have defended what 
I term the ‘pragmatic principle’ as a general principle for assessing 
claims about the nature of art:
Artworks must be entities that can bear the sorts of properties rightly as-
cribed to what are termed ‘works’ in our refl ective critical and appreciative 
practice; that are individuated in the way such ‘works’ are or would be indi-
viduated, and that have the modal properties that are reasonably ascribed 
to ‘works,’ in that practice. (Davies 2004: 18)
This instantiates, in the case of the arts, the more general idea that the 
philosopher’s task in dealing with a human practice is to seek a concep-
tual framework in terms of which to think about that practice, a frame-
work to be assessed in terms of how it helps us to achieve the proper 
goals of, and make best sense of, that practice. The suggestion above 
was that the neo-Goodmanian account of the artistic status of certain 
artifacts is better placed to answer the ‘functional artwork’ problem 
than accounts grounded in the aestheticist tradition, and might there-
by explain the artistic status of certain artifacts from cultures not 
historically continuous with our own, and the possibility and scope of 
artworks in our own cultural tradition with religious, pornographic, or 
propagandist primary intended functions.
But if a principal desideratum for any tractable account of how art-
works differ from other artifacts is that it make sense of the kinds of 
distinctions that we make in our artistic practice, then the inability 
to account for ‘mass art’ in Carroll’s sense might be seen as a major 
problem for the neo-Goodmanian. And it takes only a little refl ection to 
see that the neo-Goodmanian conception of art and Carroll’s defi nition 
of ‘mass art’ are in tension if not in outright contradiction. Carroll’s 
‘mass art’ is perhaps the most obvious example of a larger phenomenon 
that we might call ‘fast art’. I take the latter term from Tom Wolfe 
who, in The Painted Word, writes about the mid-1960’s pursuit of ‘fast 
art’ by American ‘minimalist’ painters. Minimalist art ‘theory’, reacting 
against ‘emotional evocations’ in the works of the abstract expression-
ists and their successors, dictated that “paint should be applied only in 
hard linear geometries, and you should get the whole painting at once, 
‘fast’ to use the going phrase” (Wolfe 1975: 99). Kenneth Noland, Wolfe 
claims, was known as ‘the fastest painter in the business’. ‘Fast’, here, 
does not refer to the time it takes to create a painting, but to the time 
it takes to ‘get’ one.
The category of ‘fast’ art, in Wolfe’s sense, generalizes to a wider 
class of works whose makers also seemingly aim to produce an immedi-
ate effect on the receiver. Some works, it might be said, are designed to 
shock, awe, or surprise the receiver, or overwhelm her with delight—
Damien Hirst’s notorious ‘shark’ piece might be cited as an example 
of the former phenomenon. Carroll, as noted above, seems to defi ne 
‘mass art’ in terms of being ‘fast’ in this sense, being easy for anyone to 
access without either specialised knowledge or detailed engagement. 
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A mass artwork, we may recall, ‘is intentionally designed to gravitate 
in its structural choices (for example, its narrative forms, symbolism, 
intended affect, and even its content) toward those choices that prom-
ise accessibility with minimum effort, virtually on fi rst contact, for the 
largest number of untutored (or relatively untutored) audiences’ (Car-
roll 1998: 196). Generalizing from Carroll’s characterisation of mass 
art, we may take the ‘fastness’ of an artwork to be a matter of the kind 
of cognitive effort required to ‘get’ the work rather than of the total 
amount of time that this takes.
The neo-Goodmanian maintains that what distinguishes artworks 
from other artifacts is the distinctive manner in which they are intend-
ed to articulate those contents that bear upon their primary intended 
functions. (This intentional dimension of the neo-Goodmanian account 
is one way in which it departs from Goodman’s own view.) Artworks, 
it is claimed, whatever their primary or even secondary intended func-
tions, call for a more careful, cognitively sophisticated kind of regard 
than non-artistic artifacts, a regard sensitive to subtle differences be-
tween artistic vehicles, exemplifi cational roles their constitutive fea-
tures may play, and the internally sophisticated structuring of content-
ful elements in the interests of the higher-order aims of the work. But 
this seems to distinguish artworks from non-artistic artifacts precisely 
in terms of the ‘cognitive effort’ on the part of the receiver required to 
‘get’ those contentful properties of an artifact bearing on the perfor-
mance of its primary intended function. To the extent that an artefact 
is ‘fast’ in the prescribed sense, the neo-Goodmanian view seems to 
entail that it is not an artwork. So, if there are indeed things gener-
ally viewed as artworks that are ‘fast’, it seems that we must conclude 
either (a) that we are wrong in taking them to be artworks, or (b) that 
the neo-Goodmanian view of the artwork/non-artistic artifact distinc-
tion is misguided. Since the putative works in question seem to differ 
from other unquestioned works only in degree—in how much ‘cognitive 
effort’ is required to ‘get’ them—rather than in kind, the fi rst option 
seems unattractive. The onus is therefore on the neo-Goodmanian to 
show how her account can accommodate such ‘fast’ works. Accommo-
dating Carroll’s ‘mass art’ seems to be one of the more signifi cant in-
stances of this problem.
The problem of ‘fast art’, we should note, consists in a modal claim 
grounded in some putative actual examples. The claim is that there 
can be fast works, and the works cited are actual examples that might 
be taken to establish this possibility. The formulation of the problem 
therefore does not entail that neo-Goodmanian interpretive skills are 
irrelevant to the appreciation of (at least some) artworks. The more 
limited challenge posed by the possibility of ‘fast’ artworks is that it 
seems that such scrutiny is not necessary in all cases to ‘get’ an art-
work. At least some artworks, it seems, are intended to articulate their 
contents in a non-Goodmanian manner.
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5. The problem of ‘Fast Art’: 
Two neo-Goodmanian strategies
Our examples of ‘fast art’ include both works of ‘popular art’ and cer-
tain works of late modern (Noland) and post-modern (Hirst) art. In ac-
cordance with the pragmatic principle, I take the artistic status of the 
latter examples as deniable only if there are strong (and non-question 
begging) reasons to do so. However, I take the status of ‘popular art’ as 
a whole to be open to question, for reasons to be given below. For this 
reason it will be helpful to begin with the works by Noland and Hirst. If 
we can provide an account of such artworks in neo-Goodmanian terms, 
we can then see to what extent the same kind of account might apply 
to at least some works of ‘popular art’. This might provide us with a 
principled way of drawing at least a rough distinction between those 
‘popular’ artifacts that are rightly included in the domain of artworks 
and other ‘popular’ artifacts whose claim for inclusion therein is open 
to question or even to outright denial.
In an initial consideration of neo-Goodmanian aesthetics some years 
ago, I presented the neo-Goodmanian account in a way that would, as 
a matter of act, provide an easy and conclusive solution to the problem 
of ‘fast art’ (Davies 2004: chapter 10). The proposal was to fi nesse the 
traditional distinction between ‘functional’ and ‘procedural’ defi nitions 
of art (see Stephen Davies 1991) by distinguishing artworks from other 
artifacts in terms of both functional and procedural considerations:
An artwork... articulates a content through a vehicle via an ‘artistic me-
dium’, a system of articulatory understandings in a system of the artworld... 
An artworld system is a system whose articulatory understandings facili-
tate the articulation of content through vehicles that perform symbolic func-
tions that are ‘aesthetic’ in Goodman’s sense. ‘Artwork’ is defi ned proce-
durally, by reference to a performance that intentionally draws upon an 
established system of articulatory understandings, and functionally in that 
it is by reference to the facilitating of a particular kind of symbolic func-
tioning that a system of articulatory understandings counts as an artistic 
medium. (Davies 2004: 253)
This proposal aims at a perhaps implausible marriage between ‘insti-
tutional’ theories of art and Goodman’s resolutely anti-institutionalist 
idea that something is an artwork when it performs certain distinctive 
kinds of symbolic functions (for Goodman’s terse dismissal of institu-
tional theories of art, see Goodman 1978: 66). The proposal would serve 
our current purposes in allowing for there to be artworks that were 
not themselves neo-Goodmanian symbols (thus allowing for fast art) 
as long as they employ shared understandings that count as an artistic 
medium in virtue of fostering neo-Goodmanian forms of symbolisation. 
The proposal also preserves something that is important both to ‘in-
stitutional’ theories of art (e.g. Dickie (1974) and Danto (1981), albeit 
in very different ways) and to Levinson’s ‘historical defi nition’ of art 
(1979)—the idea of art as a historical practice to which an artifact’s 
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history of making must stand in a certain relation if that artifact is to 
be an artwork. Danto’s artworld has an essential historical dimension, 
Dickie’s artistic practices are historically construed, and Levinson in-
sists that artworks must essentially involve and not merely follow upon 
past art. But it is precisely this feature of such accounts that renders 
them parochial. For what is distinctive of artifacts produced in practic-
es outside of our own cultural tradition is that they don’t stand in such 
a historical relation to that tradition and therefore, it would seem, can-
not qualify as artistic.3 And this is one reason why such theories cannot 
provide an adequate response to the ‘functional artwork’ problem.
Will the above understanding of the neo-Goodmanian account face 
the same diffi culties? It might be thought that this problem presents 
itself only if we restrict the relevant ‘artistic practices’ to our own, or to 
others that mimic them. Why can’t the neo-Goodmanian take practices 
in other cultures to be artistic because of the kinds of symbolic expres-
sion they permit or foster, and then make the move canvassed above to 
allow for equivalents of ‘fast art’? While this move is tempting, there is, 
I think, good reason to resist it: this construal of the neo-Goodmanian 
view is too permissive. For example, it would make ordinary holiday 
photos works of art unless we are able to identify some features of pho-
tographic practice that are constitutive of the ‘artistic medium’ of pho-
tography. But, even if we are able to do this, how can we justify the 
idea that these features are being ‘used’ tacitly in some artifacts whose 
contents do not make use of them (‘fast’ works of photographic art) but 
not in others that equally do not make use of them in articulating their 
contents (ordinary holiday snaps)?
A better strategy for the neo-Goodmanian, I think, is (1) to preserve 
the idea that it is the neo-Goodmanian manner in which an artifact 
articulates the contents bearing upon the performance of its primary 
intended function that makes it an artwork—this can avoid the ‘paro-
chialism’ confronting institutional theories in the broad sense, but (2) 
to seek a way of accommodating, as artworks so conceived, those appar-
ently ‘fast’ artifacts whose artistic status it is diffi cult to deny. Adopting 
this strategy, we should begin with a word that has thus far been al-
lowed to stand unexplicated in setting up the problem of ‘fast art’. I have 
talked about what is required to ‘get’ an artwork, where this word pre-
sumably functions as a vernacular term for what is involved in the ap-
preciation of a work as art. But, we may now note, talk of ‘appreciating’ 
an artwork is open to different interpretations. And, if we are to assess 
the challenge that the problem of ‘fast art’ poses to the neo-Goodmanian 
account, it is important that these interpretations are distinguished.
We can begin by setting aside one sense of ‘appreciation’—which we 
may term ‘normative appreciation’—that has no bearing on our cur-
3 Levinson’s acceptance (1979) of ‘transparently’ construed intended artistic 
regards only slightly ameliorates the problem by allowing for art outside our own 
traditions as long as it involves shared understandings that as a matter of act mirror 
some of our own.
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rent concerns. In this sense, to appreciate some entity is to like it, to 
fi nd it enjoyable, or to fi nd it valuable. In this sense, I may appreciate 
something you have done for me, or a particular experience I have had. 
We can talk in this way about artworks—I may (or may not) really ap-
preciate the songs of a particular singer or paintings by a particular 
artist—but the senses of ‘appreciate’ of interest to us in the present 
context do not, I think, carry any such determinate normative valence. 
They relate to various activities that enter into our experiential en-
gagements with the artistic vehicles of artworks, activities that may 
indeed lead us to appreciate those works in a normative sense but that 
in themselves are only a precursor to normative appreciation.
With this in mind, let me fi rst distinguish between what I shall 
term ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ appreciation. Both relate to the particu-
lar kind of experiential response to an artistic vehicle that the creator of 
an artwork wishes to produce in fashioning that vehicle in a particular 
manner. Artworks, we might say, are artifacts that are designed to be 
‘experience machines’.4 The production of a particular kind of experi-
ence in receivers is the means whereby the work is intended to fulfi l 
its intended function(s). ‘Primary’ and ‘secondary’ appreciation are two 
analytically separable dimensions of this experiential response.
Take fi rst primary appreciation. With a representational painting, 
or a photograph, or a fi lm, for example, the maker intends that the 
receiver see certain things—people, objects, or events—presented in a 
certain way in the visual array. In reading a novel, the maker intends 
that the reader imaginatively engage with a sequence of events nar-
rated by the text. In listening to a piece of music, it is intended that 
we apprehend a series of sonic events as making up a larger sound 
sequence in which the comprised events stand in sonic relationships to 
one another. If the receiver is to ‘get’ the artistic manifold presented in 
her experiential engagement with an artistic vehicle in this ‘primary’ 
sense’, she must to some extent defer to the manifold, allowing it affect 
her in certain ways. ‘Getting’ a work in this way is at least part of what 
is required to determine any work’s artistic content, and is therefore a 
necessary condition for a work’s fulfi lling for a given receiver whatever 
primary intended function it has. However, even if primary apprecia-
tion is a matter of letting the artistic vehicle work on us, being so af-
fected by the work will count as a correct primary appreciation of the 
work only if we bring to our encounter with the artistic vehicle relevant 
kinds of perceptual and conceptual skills and competencies.
Primary appreciation is experientially interwoven with our parallel 
attempts to ‘get’ the work in a further sense—to grasp and appreciate 
what we take to be reasons for the elements being ordered in the way 
that they are. This is what makes our engagement with the perceptual 
or conceptual manifold presented by a work’s artistic vehicle ‘interrog-
4 I gesture here towards William Seeley (2011) who, drawing on Mark Rollins 
(2004), speaks of artworks as ‘attentional engines’: attention is in such cases a 
precondition for producing a particular kind of experience.
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ative’. We are involved in an ongoing, partly pre-conscious, process of 
making sense of the manifold by experiencing it as structured in hier-
archical ways, where parts derive their sense from the places we assign 
them in the evolving whole. The ‘sense’ we make of the artistic mani-
fold should not be confused with the work’s primary intended func-
tion. The ‘sense’ of the manifold is, rather, what unifi es those contents 
articulated through the work’s artistic vehicle in such a way that, in 
virtue of having this ‘sense’, the work can perform its primary intended 
function. ‘Secondary appreciation’, as we may call this, is a matter of 
‘getting’ a work not only through being aware of its fi rst-order artis-
tic content, but also through ascribing to it a higher-order ‘sense’ as a 
function of its fi rst order content.
‘Primary’ and ‘secondary’ appreciation are analytically separable 
but empirically fused dimensions of the experiential engagement with 
a work’s artistic vehicle through which the work is intended by its 
maker(s) to fulfi l its primary intended function. But we also use the 
term ‘appreciation’ in a way that bears not on the experiences that 
artworks are designed to generate in order to achieve their intended 
functions, but on our assessments and evaluations of the works them-
selves as ‘experience machines’. ‘Appreciation’ here is not internal to 
what artworks are designed to do, but requires a distancing from the 
latter, while still involving an experiential engagement with the artis-
tic vehicle. Here is where we will tend to talk about properly appreciat-
ing an artwork as an artwork. What the latter is taken to require is an 
interest not merely in grasping the lower- and higher-order content, 
articulated through a work’s artistic vehicle, that bears upon the per-
formance of its primary intended function, but also in how the artist 
has used a particular artistic medium in articulating that content. ‘Ter-
tiary appreciation’ of an artwork requires that we take what we termed 
earlier a Levinsonian ‘artistic interest’ in the work, an interest in “the 
way content is embodied in form, the way medium has been employed 
to convey content” (Levinson 2005: 232).
It may be helpful to give a brief example of these distinct modes 
of appreciation. Consider Fra Angelico’s Annunciation situated at the 
head of the fl ight of stairs that leads to the dormitories in the monas-
tery (now the convent) of San Marco in Florence. Primary appreciation 
of this work requires that we allow ourselves to take in the image in 
all of its detail, to register it as a representational whole with certain 
formal relations between the different elements and certain patterned 
chromatic forms with their own affective qualities. We need to bring to 
our visual scrutiny of the image a familiarity with the general depictive 
conventions of the tradition to which Fra Angelico belonged, so that 
we can register the representational, formal, and expressive properties 
that this artistic manifold articulates through the distribution of pig-
ment on surface.
Our scrutiny of the manifold is also informed by an interrogative 
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interest in why it is this artistic manifold that Fra Angelico has created 
for the appreciation of his intended audience. Again, our interrogative 
exploration should be guided by an awareness of the range of possibili-
ties open to the artist, and also of the signifi cance of different possible 
ways of rendering the subject. The resulting secondary appreciation of 
the painting informs our primary appreciation—our experiential en-
gagement with the artistic vehicle. Insofar as our interest is in Fra 
Angelico’s creation as an artwork, however, we must consider what the 
artist has done in his medium, in order to realize in pigment the kinds 
of contentful properties—higher and lower—of the painting that bear 
upon its performance of its primary intended function. In so doing we 
seek a tertiary appreciation of the painting.
The precise nature and extent of tertiary appreciation is a much 
contested and controversial matter. In particular, one needs to ask 
to what extent tertiary appreciation is solely a matter of experiential 
engagement with an artistic manifold, and, if so, the extent to which 
that engagement should be informed by knowledge of the way in which 
that manifold came to have the features that it does. I have elsewhere 
(forthcoming) argued, here, for a distinction between what I have 
termed ‘experiential appreciation’ and ‘appreciative understanding’. 
Fortunately, however, we need not broach these matters further in the 
present context, since tertiary appreciation is not what is at issue in as-
sessing the neo-Goodmanian account and its treatment of ‘fast’ works. 
For tertiary appreciation pertains to our activities as critical assessors 
and appreciators of works for their value as artworks, rather than to 
our engagement with them so that they can perform their primary in-
tended functions. The issue between the neo-Goodmanian and the pro-
ponent of ‘fast art’ relates to the nature of primary appreciation and 
secondary appreciation. It is primary appreciation that, it seems, can 
be ‘fast’, in the sense that we can take in the fi rst-order artistic content 
of certain works ‘at a glance’. However secondary appreciation is also 
necessary if a work is to fulfi l its primary intended function, whether 
this be broadly ‘instrumental’ or more traditionally ‘aesthetic’, since 
we need to unify the elements in the artistic manifold by reference to a 
‘sense’ in virtue of which it has a particular content bearing upon the 
realization of its primary intended function. One way of putting our 
question, then, is to ask whether, if primary appreciation of a work is 
indeed sometimes ‘fast’, this is suffi cient for secondary appreciation. 
If what we can get ‘fast’ is merely necessary for secondary apprecia-
tion, and thus bears upon but does not exhaust the ‘artistic content’ of 
the work whereby it performs whatever its primary intended function 
is, then, to the extent that this content is, as we might put it, a neo-
Goodmanian function of the ‘fast’ content, the possibility of fast works 
will not call the neo-Goodmanian view into question. The proponent of 
neo-Goodmanian aesthetics might then respond to the problem of ‘fast 
art’ by making the following claim:
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[NGT] Primary appreciation of a work of art can be fast only if secondary 
appreciation is a neo-Goodmanian function of primary appreciation.
If we consider the two putatively ‘fast’ works cited earlier, it is clear 
that a strong case can be made that they in fact satisfy NGT and do 
not, therefore, present a problem for the neo-Goodmanian. Let me be-
gin with Noland. In the fi rst place, when we consider his works in more 
detail, it is not even clear that primary appreciation is fast, given the 
ways in which the rings of colour interact optically. If this interaction 
is intended as part of the work’s artistic content and if it bears upon 
secondary appreciation and on the realization of the work’s primary in-
tended function, then it seems to require the kind of detailed attention 
to the canvas that, following Wollheim, we have taken to be a distinctive 
feature of the kind of regard for which artworks call. Second, as Wolfe’s 
account makes clear, even if primary appreciation of Noland’s work 
were deemed to be ‘fast’, secondary appreciation surely is not. To grasp 
the ‘sense’ embodied in the work’s fi rst-order properties requires that 
we understand the signifi cance of the speed with which it might be pri-
marily appreciated—the signifi cance, here, of the minimalist aesthetic 
cited by Wolfe in his account. Furthermore, if the work is intended to 
be ‘fast’ for primary appreciation, this seems to bear upon the overall 
artistic content through which it fulfi ls its primary intended function 
in neo-Goodmanian ways. For example, it is through seeing such ‘fast-
ness’ as exemplifying a possibility denied by the painters whose work it 
is parodying, and doing so in a way that requires attention to detailed 
aspects of what Nolan is actually doing, that the work would, on this 
reading, articulate the content bearing on its primary intended critical 
function. So read, the work is at least partly conceptual in being about 
contemporary artworks that pursue experiential goals at the expense 
of cognitive ones, and its art-critical function is achieved by comment-
ing on the latter in a neo-Goodmanian way, as just described.
Hirst’s ‘shark’ piece also belies its apparent ‘fastness’ when we at-
tend more closely to how the artistic vehicle is supposed to articulate 
the content bearing upon its primary intended function. As critics have 
pointed out, if we accord to the artwork the sort of attention we nor-
mally accord to three-dimensional works of visual art—if, for example, 
we walk around the tank, and examine it from different angles—then 
interesting properties we would otherwise miss become apparent.
For example, the importance of the optical properties of the physi-
cal medium was noted by art critic and historian Richard Cork (2003): 
“The optical illusion of movement, generated by its abrupt shifts of 
movement behind the glass as awed visitors walked round the tank, 
suggested that the shark was still, somehow, alive.” As with the Rainer 
piece to which we alluded earlier, we can assume that there is a differ-
ence in how the spectator is supposed to regard the object on display.5 
5 For a much lengthier discussion of these aspects of the Rainer piece, see Davies 
2011: ch. 1.
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In a natural history museum, our interest in such an object is directed 
solely to the shark, its physical properties, how it is presented as mov-
ing, etc. The tank is merely a receptacle for the object of interest. When 
it is located in an art gallery, however, ‘getting’ the piece arguably re-
quires that we give the object the sort of detailed interrogative atten-
tion that we standardly give to three-dimensional works of visual art. 
When we walk around the tank, we are aware not only of the shark but 
also of the way in which its visual appearance is infl uenced by the opti-
cal properties of the transparent material of which the tank is made. 
The shark always appears to be pressing up against the surface closest 
to us, and, as we pass a corner of the tank, it appears fi rst in duplicate 
and then in a position quite different from the one it appeared to oc-
cupy before we reached the corner. Whether we follow Cork in his read-
ing of the signifi cance of this or offer an alternative interpretation,6 
it seems plausible that our engagement with the object in the gallery 
must be neo-Goodmanian if we are to grasp the relevant artistic con-
tent through which the work fulfi ls its primary intended function.
6. Making sense of ‘popular art’: A case study
Suppose that such a strategy, captured in NGR, is a plausible way of ac-
commodating those accepted artworks that might at fi rst sight appear 
to be ‘fast’ in a way that goes against the neo-Goodmanian account. 
Would this strategy also be a plausible way of artistically enfranchis-
ing works of ‘mass art’ in Carroll’s sense? The answer, it would seem, 
must be negative because it seems to follow from Carroll’s very defi ni-
tion of ‘mass art’ that works that fi t that defi nition must be ‘fast’ for 
both primary and secondary appreciation. Not only can we appreciate 
the manifest features of such works without neo-Goodmanian engage-
ment, but also the ‘sense’ rightly ascribed to such manifest features 
is the one that they most obviously serve. Secondary appreciation, it 
seems, merely requires that the features experienced in primary appre-
ciation be taken to serve no higher purpose than engaging us perceptu-
ally and emotionally.
If this were indeed the case for all those ‘popular artworks’ that Car-
roll takes to fall within the extension of his term ‘mass art’, we might 
ask whether such works are usefully grouped with the other artefacts 
that we view as artworks. For I take it that the artistic status of this 
class of ‘popular’ artefacts is at least open to reasonable dispute—at 
least, more open than the works of artists like Noland and Hirst. One 
6 I have suggested elsewhere (2004: 251–53) the following interpretation of this 
piece. In taking an interrogative interest in the thing presented as an art object, we 
might refl ect upon the fact that the shark is presented in the gallery as a physically 
impossible physical object, capable of occupying two spatial locations at the same 
time and of moving from one location to another without passing through the points 
in between. Given the title, The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of 
Someone Living, this might lead us to see the physical impossibility of the shark in 
the tank as exemplifying the physical impossibility characterised in the title.
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option for the neo-Goodmanian, then, might be to stand her ground 
and deny artistic status to these artefacts. But a much better option, 
I think, is to ask whether all of the things we intuitively take to be 
examples of popular art do indeed satisfy Carroll’s defi nition. The neo-
Goodmanian can adopt here the same strategy that was adopted ear-
lier on in setting up the ‘functional artwork’ problem. We might seek 
to distinguish, within the class of artefacts that seem to have as their 
primary intended function satisfying those kinds of desires in receivers 
that we earlier identifi ed as distinctive of ‘low art’, those that should be 
viewed as artworks having such a function. And, it might be claimed, 
these are the ones that are intended to fulfi l that function in neo-Good-
manian ways.
That this strategy may be a promising one is clear when we consider 
some of Carroll’s own examples that are used to justify the claim that 
works of ‘mass art’ in his sense are truly works of art. He cites works 
like Citizen Kane which, he argues, are aimed at a mass audience but 
are undeniably works of art. But two conditions in Carroll’s defi nition 
of ‘mass art’ must be distinguished: (a) being aimed at a general audi-
ence, and (b) being intended to be accessible with minimal cognitive or 
conceptual effort. While a work like Citizen Kane would satisfy the fi rst 
condition, it does not seem to satisfy the second but, rather, to demand 
some interrogative engagement with the immediately presented nar-
rative content if the ‘sense’ of the work is to be grasped. But if such en-
gagement on the part of those who are able to ‘get’ the work in both the 
primary and secondary sense was intended by Welles, then it seems 
that the scope of the work’s intended audience need not make it ‘fast’. 
Indeed, given Welles use of cinematographic means in presenting the 
narrative, it might be argued that neo-Goodmanian techniques are re-
quired even for primary appreciation of such a work.
But let us suppose that the makers of many works of what we would 
intuitively take to be ‘popular art’ have no such intentions, and that the 
primary intended function of such works really is to entertain in a fairly 
effortless way. Surely much popular music, much pulp fi ction, and many 
of the fi lms shown in cineplexes are intentionally ‘fast’ for both primary 
and secondary appreciation. The primary intended function is to pro-
duce affect and/or movement on the part of receivers, to be infectious, 
or to arouse widely shared feelings relating to widely shared situations, 
with minimal cognitive effort on the part of the receiver. Such artefacts 
are certainly legitimate objects of tertiary appreciation: we can take an 
interest in how they are able to have the effects that they do, how they 
‘work’.7 But, as we have seen, it is the nature of primary and secondary 
appreciation that is at issue in assessing the neo-Goodmanian account. 
And, as we might also note, we can take a tertiary appreciative interest 
in many artefacts that are clearly not artworks, as demonstrated by 
7 Tertiary appreciation of this kind seems to be what is at issue in the analysis of 
pieces of popular music in the Switched on Pop podcast discussed below.
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Baxandall’s use of the Forth Railway Bridge to exemplify the ‘historical 
explanation’ of an artifact (Baxandall 1985).
What can the neo-Goodmanian say about such instances of ‘popular 
art’? As with other artifacts with instrumental primary intended func-
tions, what the neo-Goodmanian will urge is that we need a principled 
way of distinguishing those artefacts intended for general appreciation 
that clearly are artworks from those that clearly are not, while allow-
ing for cases whose artistic status is open to debate. What we should 
not assume is that all mass artifacts that meet Carroll’s defi nition of 
‘mass art’ must be mass art. But, to sharpen the point with which we 
began, can we make the stronger point that no artifacts intended for 
a broad audience that meet Carroll’s further requirement—minimal 
cognitive effort required for appreciation—are art? Or, to approach this 
from another direction, can we explain why some of the things we would 
intuitively think of as popular artworks do not in fact meet Carroll’s 
further requirement? We have already looked at how some mainstream 
fi lms might in fact operate in a neo-Goodmanian way, being intended 
to achieve their primary intended function in virtue of articulating an 
artistic content in ways that call for ‘artistic regard’ in the stipulated 
sense. But it may be instructive to consider what might seem a more 
challenging case—the artistic credentials of popular music. Can we 
identify a basis for drawing the required distinction between works 
of popular music the realisation of whose primary intended function 
requires a neo-Goodmanian ‘artistic regard’ on the part of the receiver 
and those for which no such requirement obtains?
With popular music, matters are complicated by the fact that the 
pieces we tend to think of as ‘artistic’ often involve lyrics that by them-
selves engage our ‘higher’ interests and cognitive capacities. Examples 
of works of popular music that fi t this description would include Bruce 
Springsteen’s Born to Run, Bob Dylan’s Blonde on Blonde, and David 
Sylvian’s Brilliant Trees. On the other hand, other works of popular 
music—such as Sugar Sugar by the Archies and Hey Jude by The Bea-
tles—are not in this sense ‘literary’. The words of such songs function 
more through their sound than through their meaning, as we discover 
to our shock when we actually inspect the words of Hey Jude! Such 
songs produce affect—and are designed to do so—but do so largely 
through sub-personal mechanisms that respond to tone, timbre, and 
rhythm. There can sometimes be an artistic dimension in such songs 
that requires us to focus our attention on the ways in which words and 
music have been made to work together. The appropriate model for 
understanding such pieces as artworks would come from the ‘lieder’ 
tradition of combining music and words, as in Schubert’s musical set-
ting of Goethe’s Erlkonig (see Davies 2013). But this seems implausible 
in the cases just cited.
One strategy that might be used to artistically enfranchise main-
stream pop music is exemplifi ed in the podcast, Switched on Pop, that 
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examines chart-topping pop songs through the lens of musical theory.8 
The authors of the podcast, songwriter Charlie Harding and Fordham 
University musicology professor Nate Sloan, take the work of pop stars 
such as Carly Rae Jepsen, Justin Bieber, and Ariana Grande and focus 
not on the lyrics but on the use of particular chord progressions and 
instrumentation. They describe their project as follows:
Our goal is always to fi gure out why a song is resonating with people. Of-
ten the reason has to do with some musical technique that people might 
understand viscerally but not intellectually. In the case of DJ Khaled’s “I’m 
the One,” we thought the secret was the chord progression. Khaled is using 
a chord progression, the 1–6–4–5 progression, that has been used in some 
capacity for centuries. It’s the same progression that undergirds songs like 
“Blue Moon“, “Stand By Me“, and “I Will Always Love You.” Khaled is us-
ing this chord progression that we are all deeply familiar with, and it can’t 
help but get stuck in our heads. So for that episode we dive into the world 
of tonal harmony and how the music theorist Jean-Philippe Rameau fi rst 
encoded the way that musical harmony can work on our emotions in 1723. 
Now, three centuries later, whether he knows it or not, DJ Khaled is taking 
advantage of those same principles.
The idea that writing “frivolous” music doesn’t take a lot of artistry is mis-
guided. Mozart’s opera buffa “Così fan tutte” has the most ludicrous and 
silly plot, but man is it complex. It took all of Mozart’s considerable compo-
sitional skill. The music being put out by Justin Bieber and Diplo is com-
pletely analogous...
We had a producer duo on our show called Grey, who produced the Hailee 
Steinfeld song “Starving.” They said they spent 60 hours just fi ne tuning the 
sound of the snare drum on one of their songs. That gives you an idea of the 
immense efforts of a song you digest in three minutes and 30 seconds like 
an amuse-bouche.
If, as seems to be the case, this is intended as an argument for the ar-
tistic status of the kind of mainstream pop music cited, it clearly fails. 
That certain pop songs employ the same chord structures or harmonies 
used by classical composers to elicit affect does not make either the pop 
songs or the classical pieces works of art. Producing affect does not by 
itself make something art, especially if that affect is generated solely 
through the activation of sub-personal cognitive and perceptual mecha-
nisms. The use of lighting, camera movement, and editing to produce 
strong affect via sub-personal mechanisms in fi lms like Blade Runner 
is essential to those fi lms as works of cinematic art (Coplan 2015), but 
it is the ways in which such affect is integrated with other aspects of 
the fi lms rather than the production of affect by itself that grounds 
their artistic status. The same devices are used in advertising to get 
us to look favourably on a given product or politician, but one should 
only speak here of artworks when the elicitation of affect by such sub-
personal means is used in concert with other features that engage us 
consciously.
8 See https://qz.com/1035049/the-mozart-like-complexity-of-carly-rae-jepsens-
biggest-hits/. Accessed 3rd May 2018.
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This ties in with our earlier discussion of primary and secondary ap-
preciation. Where an artwork is intended to produce affect or perceptu-
al experience by mobilising sub-personal psychological mechanisms—
as in ‘op art’ works by Bridget Riley, for example—the achievement of a 
work’s primary intended function requires not merely a passive ‘prima-
ry’ response but also the interrogation of the manifold that is producing 
such affect. In Riley’s case, this requires that the viewer not merely re-
spond perceptually through the operation of sub-personal mechanisms 
in the visual system, but interrogate the canvas and thereby engage 
with the principles of visual perception that Riley is exploiting—and 
exploring—in her works. Works of op art are about visual perception 
and are only appreciated by one who engages with them as such. That 
something conjures with our senses or with our emotions is not suffi -
cient for its being art, even when the conjuror is an artist! 
We can make a similar point concerning the use of rhythm and dy-
namics in music to produce movement. We often fi nd ourselves uncon-
sciously moving our feet, hands or bodies in time as music is playing—
as in the café where I’m writing this—but this happens as much (if not 
more!) when I am thinking about the sentence I am writing as when 
I actually attend to the music. But, the neo-Goodmanian will insist, if 
such music is to be art, grasping the content that bears upon the arti-
fact’s performing its primary intended function must require percep-
tual and/or cognitive activity on the part of the receiver—listening to or 
looking at a perceptual manifold interrogatively in my sense—not mere 
passivity. As an example of this, consider the standard methods used 
to produce movement and affect in works of techno, and consider the 
use by more self-consciously ‘artistic’ producers—such as Underworld 
in a track like ‘Dark Train’—of not merely sound textures—which is a 
general feature of techno—but also complex polyrhythms that emerge 
from, merge into, or play off of one another. While such a piece is in-
tended to produce movement and affect, it is intended to do so through 
our active awareness of the ways in which the different elements play 
against one another and our anticipation of how this play will continue: 
we can be enthralled even after many listenings by the way in which 
the contrasting elements can be brought together. This might be seen 
as analogous to the aesthetic richness of works by a composer like Sibe-
lius when he brings strings and brass into sonorous dialogue or discord. 
In both cases, the intention is that the ‘lower’ pleasures of movement 
and affect be elicited through our attention to features of the acoustic 
manifold that function in a neo-Goodmanian way: the pleasures are 
elicited ‘artfully’, to use once again the term that Levinson applies to 
the pornographic images of artists like Klimt, Rodin, and Schiele. Gen-
eralising from these examples, while in nearly all popular music and 
cinema, certain kinds of affective and motor triggers are employed that 
affect us passively, in those such works that qualify as artworks these 
serve to frame or complete our active engagement with the perceptual 
manifold.
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7. Conclusion
The foregoing refl ections suggest that the neo-Goodmanian should in-
sist that there can be no works of art that satisfy both conditions in Car-
roll’s defi nition of ‘mass art’. While artworks are ‘experience machines’ 
not all such machines are artworks. The experiences an ‘experience 
machine’ is designed to produce are those that will enable it to fulfi l its 
primary intended function, whatever that is. For the neo-Goodmanian, 
however, what differentiates artworks from other ‘experience ma-
chines’—e.g. advertisements, much dance music, B-horror movies—is 
that they can fulfi ll their primary intended functions only if they elicit 
the perceptual activity of the receiver in interrogating the perceptual 
manifold via an artistic regard. This perceptual activity is necessary 
because the artistic content through which the primary intended func-
tion is to be achieved is articulated ‘artfully’, in a neo-Goodmanian way. 
Just as there can be ‘artful’ pornography, there can be ‘artful’ works of 
pop music, ‘artful’ movies, etc., that have as their primary intended 
function entertainment or the satisfaction of some ‘lower’ capacity or 
desire on the part of the receiver. But these would not be works of ‘mass 
art’ in Carroll’s sense, since they require the activity and not merely 
the passive receptivity of the receiver. So to the extent that something 
is an artwork, it can’t be ‘mass’ in Carroll’s sense, and to the extent that 
it is ‘mass’ in this sense it can’t be an artwork.9
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